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Abstract This paper presents a formal reconstruction of a Dutch civil legal case in Prakken’s
formal model of adjudication dialogues. The object of formalisation is the argumentative
speech acts exchanged during the dispute by the adversaries and the judge. The goal of this
formalisation is twofold: to test whether AI & law models of legal dialogues in general, and
Prakken’s model in particular, are suitable for modelling particular legal procedures; and to
learn about the process of formalising an actual legal dispute.
1 Introduction
In this paper a Dutch civil case is formalised within Prakken (2008)’s formal dialogue model
of adjudication. The object of formalisation is the argumentative speech acts exchanged
during the dispute by the adversaries and the judge. The goal of this formalisation is twofold:
to test whether AI & law models of legal dialogues in general, and my model in particular,
are suitable for modelling particular legal procedures; and to learn about the process of
formalising an actual legal dispute. These issues are of theoretical interest but they may also
have practical relevance. Lauritsen (2005) and Sombekke et al. (2007) have proposed the
idea of ‘legal argument management systems’, supporting the user in structuring a collection
of case-related documents in terms of the argumentation structure of a case. The structure
would capture the main issues, the main positions and arguments taken by the parties with
respect to the issues, the available evidence related to them, and so on. Incoming documents
could be indexed according to this structure and new documents could be drafted according
to the same structure and linked to other documents. The present study may yield insights
into how such systems should be designed.
The analysed case is about ownership of a large camping tent. Its case files were pub-
lished as (Leclerq; 1990), to be used in legal teaching. These files were previously used by
Leenes (1998) to illustrate Hage et al. (1994)’s and Lodder (1999)’s theoretical models of
legal disputes. Leenes did not attempt to give a full formalisation of the case, and he did not
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2analyse the evidence phase at all. The present paper gives such a full formalisation, and does
so of (almost) the entire case, including the evidence phase.
As a legal dispute, there is not much remarkable about this case. Both the solicitors and
the judge reason in rather mundane ways, and the better solicitor loses simply because his
evidence is not good enough. Therefore, those interested in the modelling of the intricate
details of skilled legal argument might be disappointed. However, the routine nature of this
case is precisely why its modelling is important. If we want to build computer systems
that support legal discourse in practice, it seems more useful to build such systems for the
average case instead of for the exception. Despite its mundane legal character, the case still
contains some interesting argumentative features. It contains two examples of legal rules
with exceptions. One of them induces a shift in the burden of proof, explicitly expressed
by the judge in an allocation of the burden of proof. The case also contains an argument
on the priority of legal rules, and it contains a dispute on the reliability of witnesses; the
latter dispute highlights the distinction between rebutting and undercutting arguments. The
evidential arguments also raise the issue of accrual of arguments. On the other hand, the
case does not contain sophisticated case-based reasoning or theory formation.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the case is described and the rele-
vant substantive and procedural law are sketched. In Sections 3 and 4, respectively, the
formalisms used to represent the case and the representation methods used within these for-
malisms are summarised, after which the full representation is given in Section 5. Finally,
some lessons learned are discussed in Section 6.
2 The case and the relevant law
The case concerns a civil dispute concerning ownership of a movable good. Plaintiff (Nieborg)
and his wife were friends of van der Velde, who owned a large tent at a camp site. At some
point van der Velde mentioned that the tent was for sale for fl. 850 (approximately 380
Euro). Nieborg replied that he was interested but could not afford the price. Van der Velde
still made his tent available to Nieborg, who in return helped van der Velde to paint his
house, while Mrs. Nieborg for some period assisted Mrs. van der Velde with her domestic
work. At some stage, Nieborg claimed that he and his wife had done enough work to pay the
sales price for the tent. This made van der Velde very angry and he demanded the tent back
since, so he argued, he had never sold the tent but only made it available to Nieborg for the
period that van der Velde did not need it. He had done so since Nieborg had told him that
he and his his wife had never had enough money to go on holiday. When Nieborg refused
to return the tent, van der Velde, assisted by a group of people, threw Nieborg’s son (who at
that point was the only person present) out of the tent and took it away. A few months later,
van der Velde sold the tent to defendant (van der Weg) and his wife. Remarkably, the sales
price (fl. 850) was paid with domestic work by Mrs. van der Weg in assistance of Mrs. van
der Velde; this was the same arrangement that Nieborg had claimed he had agreed with van
der Velde and which van der Velde had denied.
In court, Nieborg (plaintiff) claims return of the tent to him on the basis of his ownership.
van der Weg (defendant) disputes Nieborg’s claim on the grounds that van der Velde had not
sold the tent to Nieborg but only given it on loan, and that the work done by Mr. and Mrs.
Nieborg was not done to pay the sales price but out of gratitude.
3The relevant law is quite intricate1. The main legal rule governing the case is Section
2014 of the (former) Dutch Civil code (BW), which contains both a general rule and an
exception on ownership of movable goods. The rule both has legal-substantive relevance
(who is the owner) and legal-procedural relevance (who must prove ownership?). As for
substantive issues, the general rule of 2014 BW says that “possession” of a good “in good
faith” makes a person owner of the good. The exception says that if some other person was
the owner of the good less than three years ago and involuntarily lost possession (e.g. by
theft), that other person is still the owner. As for the burden of proof, these rules imply that
possession of a good creates a presumption in favour of ownership, so that anyone who
claims ownership on the basis of the exception must prove both that they involuntarily lost
possession of the good less than three years ago, and that at that time they owned the good.
In the present case (less than three years after the violent events) van der Weg only pro
forma disputed that Nieborg involuntarily lost possession of the tent, and Nieborg easily
proved this with witnesses. The main issue of the case was whether van der Velde had sold
the tent to Nieborg, so that Nieborg was owner at the time of the violent events, or whether
van der Velde had just given the tent on loan, so that van der Velde had remained the owner.
Besides this factual issue, the case also contained a main legal issue, which was dealt
with in an intermediate two-stage appeal phase. To meet her burden of proof, Nieborg’s
solicitor followed an intricate line of reasoning, using a cascade of three legal presumptions
to prove ownership of Nieborg at the time of the violent events from the mere fact that
Nieborg’s son occupied the tent at that time. Firstly, plaintiff made retrospective use of the
general rule of 2014 BW that possession in good faith of a good creates a presumption of
ownership, claiming that at the time of the violent removal of Nieborg’s son from the tent,
Nieborg was in possession of the tent in good faith. This move raised the main legal issue of
the case, viz. whether such retrospective use of 2014 BW is allowed or whether 2014 BW
can only be used by the current owner of a good (in this case defendant). In an intermediate
decision on the burden of proof the district court ruled that the latter was the case, but this
decision was overturned by the Dutch Court of Cassation.
Plaintiff had to pursue his intricate line of reasoning with two further steps to prove that
at the time of the violent events Nieborg had possession in good faith of the tent. Firstly,
in Dutch law “possession” does not just mean “holding” (in the physical sense); it means
“holding as if one were the owner”. Here plaintiff could use another legal presumption,
viz. Section 590 BW, which says that holding a good creates a presumption in favour of
possessing it. Secondly, plaintiff needed to prove that Nieborg’s possession was ‘in good
faith’; here plaintiff could use a third legal presumption, viz. the one of Section 589 BW that
possession is presumed to be in good faith.
Was this line of reasoning sufficient for plaintiff to win the case? No it was not, since
Section 590 BW states an explicit exception to the presumption in case the holding started
as “holding for someone else”. Clearly, being given a tent on loan is an instance of this
exception. Accordingly, while plaintiff was allocated the (easy) burden of proving that he
involuntarily lost possession of the tent, defendant was allocated the (tougher) burden to
prove that van der Velde had not sold the tent to Nieborg but had given it on loan. Now the
outcome of the case was that both parties succeeded in meeting their burden of proof, so that
defendant, who had proved the exception, won the case.
I next briefly describe Dutch civil procedure at the time of the case (1974-1978) as far
as relevant for present purposes. A procedure is divided into a ‘pleadings phase’, where
the adversaries plead their case before the judge and provide evidence when assigned the
1 The numbering of the statute sections below is as it was at the time of the case, in 1974-1978.
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the case. The pleadings phase is separated into a written and an (optional) oral part. In
the written part the parties exchange at least two and usually four documents (recently the
law was changed to make this “usually two”). The first is plaintiff’s Statement of Claim,
which has to contain plaintiff’s claim plus his grounds for the claim. These grounds may be
purely factual: plaintiff may leave out the legal ‘warrant’ connecting grounds and claim, as
may both parties in all their other arguments. Also, parties do not need to explicitly state
common-sense knowledge, and if they state such knowledge, they do not need to prove it;
however, the judge decides what is common-sense knowledge. Defendant replies with her
Defence, which has to contain defendant’s defences, i.e., her attacks against plaintiff’s claim
and grounds. The adversaries may then exchange further documents as long as allowed by
the judge, on whose content the procedural rules state no conditions. The documents of
the second turn are called Reply and Rejoinder. In these documents, both adversaries may
adduce further grounds and defences (except procedural defences, which must all be stated
in the Defence). Each party may also ask to provide oral pleading. During the pleadings
phase the judge assigns the burden of proof to a party whenever appropriate, after which that
party must provide evidence. After the pleadings phase has ended, the judge gives his/her
verdict. An important principle here is that the judge is passive with respect to the factual
basis of the dispute. For instance, the judge must accept undisputed claims of the adversaries,
and s/he must evaluate the evidence and give the verdict on the basis of the evidence adduced
by the parties (but s/he may add generally known facts and the relevant rules of law). On
the other hand, the judge is (with a few exceptions) free to assess the relevance and strength
of the evidence adduced by the adversaries, and s/he has no obligation to respond to the
adversaries’ arguments on these matters. For the present case study it is particularly relevant
that the judge does not have to justify why s/he believes a witness and does not have to
respond the adversaries’ arguments on the credibility of witnesses.
3 The representation technique: Prakken (2008)’s formal model of adjudication
The object of formalisation is the argumentative speech acts exchanged during the dispute
by the adversaries and the judge. Therefore, a system is needed for so-called adjudica-
tion dialogues, i.e., for dialogues between two adversaries, plaintiff (pi) and defendant (δ ),
and a neutral third party. As such the system of Prakken (2008) is used, which extends
Prakken (2005a)’s system for two-party dialogues with an adjudicator (in this case study
called ‘judge’, (ι)). It takes a game-theoretic approach to dialogues in that speech acts are
viewed as moves in a game and rules for when these moves are allowed are formulated as
rules of the game. The system has a topic language with a logic, and a communication lan-
guage with a protocol. The protocol specifies the allowed moves at each point in a dialogue
and determines turntaking and dialogue termination. The system also has effect rules, which
specify the effects of utterances on the state of the dialogue, and outcome rules. Below these
elements are briefly described.
3.1 The topic language and logic
The topic language and logic used in this paper is Prakken and Sartor (1996)’s argument-
based version of extended logic programming with defeasible priorities, as adapted by
Prakken (2001) to shifting dialectical roles. (However, the representation will be such that
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with assumptions, inapplicability statements and priority rules. Information is expressed as
a set of rules in the language of extended logic programming, which has both negation as
failure (∼) and classical, or strong negation (¬). Each rule is preceded by a term, its name.
Rules are strict, represented with→, or else defeasible, represented with⇒. Facts are rep-
resented as strict rules with empty antecedents.
To give an example, the legal rules 2014,1 and 2014,2 BW discussed in Section 2 above
could be formalised as follows:
r1(x,y, t): PossessesInGoodFaith(x,y, t)⇒ Owner(x,y, t)
r2(x,y,z, t, t ′): PossessesInGoodFaith(x,y, t)∧Owner(z,y, t ′)∧ (t− t ′)< 3years ∧
InvoluntaryLoss(z,y, t ′)⇒¬Owner(x,y, t)
Arguments can be formed by chaining rules into trees2, ignoring weakly negated antecedents.
Conflicts between arguments are decided according to a binary relation of defeat among ar-
guments, which is partly induced by rule priorities, which can be reasoned about as any other
legal issue. For example, the following is a priority rule (the legal Lex Specialis principle)
that could be used to adjudicate a conflict between 2014,1 and 2014,2 BW.
p1(x,y): Exception(x,y)⇒ x y.
If also the fact
f1: → Exception(r2,r1)
is added, then a priority argument can be constructed that gives precedence to r2 over r1.
There are three ways in which an argument A2 can defeat an argument A1. The first is
assumption defeat (in Prakken and Sartor (1996) called “undercutting” defeat), which occurs
if a rule in A1 contains ∼ L in its body, while A2 has a conclusion L (note that ∼ L reads as
‘L cannot be derived’). For example, the legal presumption 590 BW that holding an object
presumes possession unless the holding started for someone else and its exception in case
the object was obtained on loan, both discussed in Section 2, can be formalised as follows:
r3(x,y, t): Holds(x,y, t)∧ ∼ StartedHoldingForSomeoneElse(x,y)⇒
Possesses(x,y, t)
r4(x,y): ObtainedOnLoan(x,y)⇒ StartedHoldingForSomeoneElse(x,y)
Then an argument using r4 assumption-defeats an argument based on r3.
The other two forms of defeat are only possible if A1 does not assumption-defeat A2.
One way is by excluding an argument, which happens when A2 concludes for some rule r in
A1 that r is not applicable (formalised as ¬Appl(r)). The other is by rebutting an argument,
which happens when A1 and A2 contain rules that are in a head-to-head conflict (as rules
r1 and r2 above) and A2’s rule is not worse than the conflicting rule in A1 (according to p1
and f1 this holds for r2 compared to r1 but not vice versa). Note that all these attacks can be
targeted at the final rule or conclusion of an argument but also at each intermediate rule or
conclusion. Also, an argument A1 is said to strictly defeat an argument A2 if A1 defeats A2
and not vice-versa.
Arguments are assigned a dialectical status in terms of three classes: the ‘winning’ or
justified arguments, the ‘losing’ or overruled arguments, and the ‘ties’, i.e., the defensible
arguments. Accordingly, a proposition is justified if there exists a justified argument for it,
and it is defensible if it is not justified but there exists a defensible argument for it.
Whether an argument is justified can be tested in a so-called argument game between
a proponent and an opponent for the argument. Proponent starts with an argument that he
2 Strictly speaking arguments in this logic are deductions instead of proof trees, but the conversion between
these formats is straightforward.
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argument or move a priority argument that stops the previous argument from defeating its
target. Moreover, proponent’s defeating arguments must be such that they strictly defeat
opponent’s arguments. A player wins if the other player has run out of moves. The initial
argument is justified if the proponent has a winning strategy in this game. Non-justified
arguments are overruled if they are defeated by a justified argument, otherwise they are
defensible. This argument game is sound and complete with respect to grounded semantics.
In Prakken (2001) this argument game was extended with the possibility of switching
dialectical roles, to allow for the modelling of distributions of the burden of proof over the
two sides in a dispute. The proof burden at stake here is the ‘burden of persuasion’, that is,
the burden to prove a statement to a specified degree (the standard of proof) on the penalty
of losing on the issue (cf. Prakken and Sartor 2007). The new game is between two players,
called plaintiff (pi) and defendant (δ ), who at any time can have either proponent role (P) or
opponent role (O), depending on the context. The input of the new logic is not just a set of
rules but also an allocation of proof burdens for some literals to both parties. Plaintiff starts
each game as proponent but then these roles are reversed each time the player currently
having opponent role moves an argument for a conclusion for which the burden of proof is
allocated to him: the player then becomes the proponent with regard to that conclusion and
thus he has to strictly defeat the other player’s arguments.
3.2 The communication language
The communication language of the dialogue system, summarised in Table 13, is a set of
speech acts ordered by a binary reply relation, where each reply is either an attack on or
surrender to its target. A dialogue is a sequence of moves, where a dialogue move is a speech
act moved by one of the participants, indicating to which preceding move in the dialogue it
replies. Each speech act has a locution part and a content part; the former indicates the type
of speech act while the latter, if not empty, is either a statement from the topic language or
an argument from its logic. The language allows the participants to claim, dispute, concede
and retract propositions, to move arguments in support of propositions (whether claimed or
moved as a premise of another argument), to attack arguments with counterarguments and
to move priority arguments. Furthermore, a party can try to put the burden of proof onto
another party by replying to a disputing of ϕ (i.e., to a why ϕ move) with disputing the
opposite of ϕ (i.e., with a why −ϕ move). The language also contains three speech acts to
be only used by the adjudicator, namely, for terminating a dialogue, for ruling a move legal-
procedurally illegal and for determining the burden of proof concerning statements disputed
by the adversaries. Note that when the adjudicator rules a move procedurally illegal, this
does not mean that the move violates the rules of our formal dialogue game but that it
violates the rules of the applicable legal procedure (in our case study Dutch civil procedure).
Finally, a turn is a maximal sequence of dialogue moves moved by the same participant; each
turn is ended by moving the pass speech act.
3 In this table he complement of a formula ϕ , denoted by −ϕ , is ¬ϕ if ϕ does not start with a negation
and ϕ ′ if ϕ = ¬ϕ ′.
7Table 1 A communication language for adjudication dialogues
Acts Attacks Surrenders
claim ϕ why ϕ concede ϕ
illegal m




argue A why ϕ (ϕ ∈ prem(A)), concede ϕ
argue B (ϕ ∈ prem(A) or
ϕ = conc(A))
illegal m
concede ϕ illegal m






The protocol divides each dialogue into a pleadings phase, in which the parties plead the
case and the adjudicator merely regulates the dispute, and a decision phase, in which the
adjudicator is the only player and has to decide the dispute.
Each dialogue starts with an initial claim or argument by the plaintiff, which initiates the
pleadings phase. In this phase each further move must reply to a move of the other party in an
earlier turn, where each reply must be licensed by the reply structure of the communication
language. In the pleadings phase the adjudicator may only rule a move legal-procedurally
illegal, determine the burden of proof concerning statements disputed by the adversaries
and terminate the pleadings phase; these moves cannot be made by the adversaries. As for
turntaking, in the pleadings phase an adversary may in each turn make as many moves as
he wants. He may also move alternative replies to the same move, whether in the same turn
or later. When an adversary has ended his turn, the turn shifts to the adjudicator. She first
decides on the procedural correctness of the moves made in the previous turn, by deciding
whether or not to move an illegal move. Then she can allocate the burden of proof of propo-
sitions that have been disputed with a why ϕ move by replying with a burden(−ϕ,a) reply
to that move or with a burden(ϕ,a′) reply to the target of the disputation (where a and a′ are
the two adversaries). Finally she decides whether to terminate the pleadings phase. If she
does not terminate it, then the turn shifts to the current loser (to be defined below) at the end
of the adjudicator’s turn.
In the decision phase only the adjudicator can move and until termination she can only
move arguments, including counterarguments and priority arguments. She must still respect
the reply structure of the communication language but she may reply to her own moves;
the latter allows ‘internal dialectic’, in which the adjudicator considers and rejects possible
counterarguments to her arguments.
Finally, in both the pleadings and decision phase argue moves must respect the rules of
the argument game of the underlying logic. This can be verified in terms of the so-called
‘associated argument graph’ of a dialogue, to be described below.
83.4 Outcome rules
When the adjudicator terminates the decision phase, the winner is determined by the so-
called dialogical status of plaintiff’s main claim, as follows. Since each non-initial dialogue
move (except a pass and terminate move) replies to precisely one earlier dialogue move, and
since alternative replies to a move are allowed, a dialogue can be viewed as a tree of dialogue
moves linked by reply relations of two kinds. This tree structure is exploited by the definition
of dialogical status of a move. Briefly, a move is in if either it has a surrendering reply or
else all its attacking replies are out. And an attacking move is out if it has an attacking reply
that is in. Note that this makes the attacking leaves of the dialogue tree trivially in.
Dialogical status is used for determining both the ‘current’ and ‘final’ winner and loser
of a dispute (the current winner is the winner at any given nonterminated dialogue stage,
while the final winner is the winner at termination of the decision phase). If at a certain
intermediate (or final) stage the initial claim is in, plaintiff currently (finally) wins, otherwise
defendant currently (finally) wins. As noted above, the notion of a current winner can be
used to define turntaking. It can also be used to impose a relevance criterion on moves.
Briefly, this criterion says that each move must reply to a target such that, if that target
were attacked, the mover of the attack would become the new current winner. In effect,
this means that in a protocol requiring that moves are relevant the adversaries’ turns must
consist of zero or more surrenders followed by zero or one attacker, after which the turn
shifts. However, in the formalisation below I will not require that each move be relevant,
since in legal disputes of this kind the adversaries often exchange lengthy documents with
various alternative attacks and defences, so that the turn cannot shift as soon as the dialogical
status of the main claim has changed. In terms of Prakken (2005a) the protocol used is that
for so-called liberal dialogues.
3.5 Effect rules
The most immediate effect of a move is that it is appended to the dialogue so far. Fur-
thermore, argue moves have an effect on the so-called ‘associated argument graph’ of the
dialogue, which contains all arguments and counterarguments that were stepwise built dur-
ing a dialogue and their dialectical relations. This graph can be used to verify whether an
argue move respects the rule of the argument game of the underlying logic. Moreover, the
so-called defended part of the argument graph can be obtained by omitting all arguments
that have disputed premises for which no further argument was moved. Ideally, the outcome
of the dialogue corresponds with its argument graph in that the initial move of a dialogue
is in just in case the defended part of the argument graph makes an argument for the initial
claim justified. In Prakken (2005a) it is proven that this holds on two conditions: that no
surrenders are moved (since a player can, for instance, concede or retract a claim even if
he logically does not have to) and that the dialogue is ‘logically completed’, i.e., no new
relevant arguments can be moved in the dialogue without stating new premises.
4 Formalisation method
Within the formalisms of Section 3 some modelling choices must be made. Firstly, although
a formal logic is assumed, the various arguments and propositions will be semiformally para-
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logic expressions and rule premises will be left implicit or only named.
An important representation issue is that of unexpressed premises. As explained above,
Dutch civil procedure allows the adversaries to leave the applicable law and commonsense
knowledge implicit, and requires the judge to complete such incomplete arguments. How-
ever, the present combination of dialogue system and logic does not allow for logically in-
complete arguments, and therefore this feature of the dispute cannot be modelled. I assume
that each argument is complete according to the logic, but in presenting arguments I will
leave common-sense and legal classification rules implicit and mention legal rules by their
name only, assuming that the logical form of all these rule premises is that of a defeasible
rule in the above-sketched logic of Prakken and Sartor (1996).
A related issue here is that of defeasible inference rules. In (Prakken and Sartor; 1996)
the only possible inference steps within an argument are standard-logical reasoning as well
as defeasible modus ponens applied to rules. However, we will see below that several rule
premises are in fact based on general defeasible argument schemes (Walton; 1996), such as
temporal persistence and reasoning from witness evidence. Argument schemes are stereo-
typical forms of reasoning and critical questions are pointers to counterarguments of ar-
guments formed with these schemes. In the logic of Prakken and Sartor (1996) argument
schemes must be formalised as defeasible rules and negative answers to critical questions
as arguments against the applicability of a rule. In the present case this is only relevant for
rule premises based on the witness testimony scheme. I will assume that this scheme has the
following semi-formal nature:
Witness W says that ϕ , therefore (presumably) ϕ
and has the following critical questions:
1. Was W in the position to know about ϕ?
2. Is W sincere?
3. Did W ’s senses function properly when observing ϕ?
4. Did W ’s memory function properly when testifying that ϕ?
Questions 2,3 and 4 are based on David Schum’s work on witness reliability (e.g. Schum
(1994)) while the positive answer to (1) is regarded by Walton (1996) as a premise of the
scheme; I have instead made it into a critical question, since all arguments in this case using
witness testimonies leave it implicit so that a positive answer is arguably assumed. In the
present logic the scheme translates to a rule
rw: Witness(x,ϕ)∧ Says(x,ϕ)⇒ ϕ
Here ϕ is a term denoting the literal ϕ . Furthermore, the second critical question induces
the inapplicability rule
qw1: ¬ Sincere(x,ϕ)⇒¬ Appl(rw(x,ϕ))
Since the other critical questions play no role in the present case, they will not be formalised.
Another issue is the proper formalisation of priority arguments. As explained above in
Section 3.1, in (Prakken and Sartor; 1996) this is modelled directly as arguments about the
relative priority of conflicting rules. For example, in the present case plaintiff argues that
Section 2014,2 BW prevails over Section 2014,1 BW since the second is an exception to
the first. In the present logic this argument can be formalised as explained above. However,
others, e.g. Hage (1997) and Kowalski and Toni (1996), have argued that it is better to
formalise priority arguments as arguments on the applicability of rules. If this method is




Moreover, the predicate Conflict must be defined in further rules. My formalisation will
not crucially depend on which method is chosen. Although it will contain a direct priority
argument, the formalisation can easily be adapted to the other method.
The next issue is that of accrual of arguments, or whether a logic should formalise the
principle that having more arguments for the same conclusion improves one’s position. In
(Prakken; 2005b) I proposed a method for extending argument-based logics with this princi-
ple but a discussion of this method is beyond the scope of this paper. (Note that the ‘reason-
based logic’ of Hage (1997) already has an accrual mechanism.)
As for the dialogue structure, the formalisation will not reflect the actual order in which
the dispute evolved; rather it will reflect the structural-dialogical relations between the vari-
ous procedural acts. (In fact, in one case a reply to a certain statement was made before the
statement itself! Such moves are possible since the parties already discussed the case with
each other before it was brought to court, so they more or less know each other’s positions.)
The reasons for this choice will be explained in more detail in Section 6.
5 The Representation
In this section the case is formalised based on the case files as published in Leclerq (1990),
in particular the adversaries’ Statement of Claim, Defence, Reply and Rejoinder and their
conclusions after the witness interrogations, and the court’s final verdict. For simplicity the
appeal phase concerning the intermediate allocation of the burden of proof will be ignored,
assuming that the decision after appeal was the initial one. In agreement with Prakken (2008)
the formalisation is divided into a pleadings and a decision phase. The pleadings phase
is further divided into the part before the witness testimonies, in which the legal issues
were discussed (Claim, Defence, Reply, Rejoinder and intermediate verdict) and subsequent
phase, in which it was discussed whether the evidence supports the legal claims.
In the model of Prakken (2008) each turn must end with a pass move. Below I will leave
these moves implicit. Also, since procedural legality of moves was not at issue, I will below
not say anything on this. Note that all moves are implicitly ruled legal by the judge.
The moves are specified as follows: first the move is given preceded by its name, then the
target move to which it replies in the dialogue and the move’s effect on the dialogical status
of its target and the initial move. Figures 1, 2 and 3 below visualise the dialogical structure
of the dispute. Visualisations of the arguments and their relations are available online at
http://people.cs.uu.nl/henry/tent07.html. Several aspects of the reconstruction will
be omitted for reasons of space; the full reconstruction is available as (Prakken; 2007).
5.1 Discussing the legal issues in the pleadings phase
At the start of the dispute, plaintiff is proponent and defendant is opponent in the underly-
ing argument game. This means that plaintiff’s counterarguments must strictly defeat their
target, while defendant’s arguments only need to defeat their target.
pi1: argue A1 (1) I owned the tent at t1, so (2) I own the tent now at t3. Furthermore, (3)
defendant holds the tent, (4) I involuntarily lost possession of the tent at t1, so by Section
2014,2 BW (5) defendant must return the tent to me.
Plaintiff starts the dispute with an argument for his main claim. The implicit commonsense
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rule that is used to infer (2) is in fact the argument scheme of temporal persistence.
δ2: concede (3) I hold the tent. [Target: pi1; defendant moves a surrender, so pi1 stays in.]
δ3: why (1) plaintiff was owner at t1? [Target: pi1; move pi1 is made out.]
δ4: why (4) did you involuntarily lose possession of the tent at t1? [Target: pi1, which stays
out.]
δ3 and δ4 are expressed in the defence as “defendant denies that plaintiff involuntarily lost
possession of the tent while being the owner”. Arguably, a denial is stronger than just a dis-
putation, implying a claim to the contrary statement.
δ5: argue A2: (6) I bought the tent at t2 from V at a price of fl. 850, (7) V delivered the
tent to me at t2. Furthermore, (8) my wife did domestic work for van der Velde valued fl.
850, so (9) I paid the sales price; so I obtained the tent in possession in good faith at t2,
so by 2014, 1 BW (10) I became owner of the tent at t2, so (11) I now own the tent at t3.
Furthermore, (12) plaintiff has no other right to the tent, so (13) I do not have to return the
tent. [Target: pi1, which stays out.]
Defendant’s first counterargument is that by buying and obtaining the tent from van der
Velde, he obtained the tent in possession in good faith and so became owner of the tent.
pi6: why was I not owner at t1? [Target: δ3, which is made out. But since defendant launched
two further attacks on pi1, that move stays out.]
Plaintiff tries to shift the burden of proof onto defendant. This move can be traced back to a
general statement of plaintiff in his Reply (paragraph 5) that he is of the opinion that he has
no burden of proof for his claims. In the protocol of Prakken (2008) move pi6 is required to
allow the judge to express an explicit burden allocation on the issue of whether (1) holds.
pi7: why did I not involuntarily lose possession of the tent at t1? [Target: δ4, made out.]
This move is also based on plaintiff’s general statement in paragraph 5 of his reply.
ι8: burden(1,pi) [Target: pi6, which is made out, which makes δ3 in again.]
The judge assigns to plaintiff the burden of proving his ownership of the tent at t1, applying
the general rule that a party who makes a legal claim has to prove the ’legal-operative’ facts
for that claim.
ι9: burden(4,pi) [Target: pi7]
On the same grounds the judge assigns to plaintiff the burden of proving that he involuntar-
ily lost possession of the tent at t1.
pi10: argue A3 (14) My son occupied the tent at t1, (15) I and my family held the tent in
normal use from obtaining the tent to t1, so, (16) I held the tent at t1. So, by the presumption
of 590 BW, (17) I had possession of the tent at t1, so, by the presumption of 589 BW, (18)
I had possession in good faith of the tent at t1, so, by the presumption of 2014,1 BW, (1) I
owned the tent at t1. [Target: δ3, which is is made out. However, to make pi1 in two further
attacks are needed.]
Plaintiff argues for his ownership at t1 with the cascade of three legal presumptions.
pi11: argue A4: (19) 2014,2 BW is an exception to 2014,1 BW, so, by Lex Specialis, (20)
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2014,2 BW prevails over 2014,1 BW. [Target: δ5, which is made out.]
Plaintiff argues that, since defendant’s counterargument A2 is based on a general rule while
plaintiff’s argument A1 is based on on an exception, his argument prevails. This argument
is implicit in Plaintiff’s remarks in his Reply (paragraph 2) that he wants to “leave open”
whether he agrees that defendant bought the tent, since that is irrelevant, since he has be-
come the owner by 2014, 2 BW.
pi12: argue A5: (14) My son occupied the tent at t1, (15) I and my family held the tent in
normal use from obtaining the tent to t1, (21) violent events at t1, so, (4) I involuntarily lost
possession of the tent at t1. [Target: δ4, which is also made out so now pi1 becomes in.]
Plaintiff says that he involuntarily lost possession of the tent by the violent events.
δ13: concede (14) Plaintiff’s son occupied the tent at t1. [Target: pi12, which stays in.]
Defendant concedes that plaintiff’s son occupied the tent at the time of the violent events.
Whether defendant has actually conceded this claim is a matter of interpretation. I have
based my interpretation on his statement in the Rejoinder that “I have heard people saying
that plaintiff had obtained the tent on loan from van der Velde . . . ”.
δ14: concede (14) Plaintiff’s son occupied the tent at t1. [Target: pi10, which stays in.]
Defendant repeats his concession in reply to pi10, since that move used the same premise
in a different argument. In reality defendant did not repeat this move: the repetition is re-
quired by the formal framework, which does not allow ‘global’ concessions or disputations
of propositions but requires them to be targeted at specific usages of the propositions.
δ15: why (21) Violent events at t1 [Target: pi12, made out which makes δ4 in and so pi1
out.]
That defendant disputes that the violent events occurred is my interpretation of the fact that
defendant in his Rejoinder says “I deny the rest of what plaintiff has said in his Reply be-
cause of lack of knowledge.”.
δ16: argue A6: (22) Nieborg obtained the tent on loan from V., so, (23) Nieborg started
holding the tent for someone else, so (24), the assumption of 590 BW to the contrary is
false. [Target: pi10, which is also made out.]
Nieborg argues that the exception to the presumption of 590 BW applies.
δ17: argue A7: (25) t1 is in the past, (26) 2014, 1 BW does not apply to past events, so
(27) 2014,1 BW is not applicable. [Target: pi10, which stays out.]
Defendant argues against plaintiff’s retrospective use of 2014, 1 BW. In the case files defen-
dant actually expressed this argument as: “An appeal to 2014, 2 BW can only be made by
the owner, not by the holder. Therefore, plaintiff has to prove his ownership.”. This is quite
elliptic; for a further discussion see Prakken (2007).
pi18: argue A8: (28) premises, so (29) 2014, 1 BW also applies to past events. [Target: δ17,
which is is made out.]
Plaintiff rebuts defendant’s interpretation argument. The premises are not made explicit
since this debate was in fact conducted in the intermediate appeal stage on the judge’s initial
allocations of the burden of proof, which implicitly accepted defendant’s argument A7. The
High Court overturned this decision and accepted Plaintiff’s argument.
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pi19: why did the violent events not occur at t1? [Target: δ15, which is made out so pi10
becomes in. But since pi10 is still out, pi1 stays out.]
This and the next move are also based on plaintiff’s general statement in paragraph 5 of his
reply.
pi20: why (22) did I obtain the tent on loan from V.? [Target: δ16, which is made out which
makes pi10 and so pi1 in.]
ι21: burden(21,pi) [Target: pi19, which is made out so δ15 is made in and pi12 out, which
makes δ4 in and and pi1 out.]
The judge assigns the burden of proving (21) to plaintiff.
δ22: why did you not obtain the tent on loan from V.? [Target: pi20), which is made out
so pi10 also becomes out.]
ι23: burden(22,δ ) [Target: δ22, which is made out which makes pi10 in and δ3 out. How-
ever, pi1 stays out since its other attacker δ4 is still in.]
The judge allocates the burden of proving the exception (22) to defendant. The last move
has has induced a switch of the dialectical roles in the underlying logical argument game
(see Prakken (2001): defendant has become proponent and plaintiff has become opponent
with respect to A6. This means that, as far as the argument game about A6 is concerned,
defendant’s counterarguments have to strictly defeat their target, while plaintiff’s arguments
may weakly defeat their target. In more legal terms: the judge must become convinced that
plaintiff obtained the tent on loan from van der Velde; it is not enough for defendant if the
judge is not convinced that plaintiff did not obtain the tent on loan. On the other hand, with
respect to the issue of the violent events, plaintiff is the proponent while defendant is the
opponent.
The discussion in the claim phase on the legal issues has now ended. Figure 1 displays
the reply structure of the dialogue so far and the dialogical status of all its moves. (In this
figure grey coloured moves are in while white-coloured moves are out. The moves pi24 and
δ26 from the decision phase have been added to show how the dialogue will continue in
that phase.) If we apply the logic of Prakken and Sartor (1996) to the set of all arguments
constructed so far (in terms of Prakken (2005a, 2008) the ’associated argument graph’ of the
dialogue) then plaintiff’s main argument, consisting of A1 +A3 +A5, is overruled, since it is
undercut by a non-attacked argument, viz. A6. The ‘defended part’ of the argument graph is
obtained by deleting all arguments with disputed premises; it consists of only A2, A4, A7 and
A8, since A1 +A3 +A5 has a disputed premise (21) while A6 has a disputed premise (22).
The defended part does not contain an argument for plaintiff’s main argument, which agrees
with the dialogical status of pi1 at this stage, which is out.
Note that pi1 is out since δ4 is in. In the following phase, in which evidence is provided
for the claims to be proven, plaintiff will try to make it in by providing an evidential argu-
ment for (21) that he lost the tent by the violent events. If this succeeds and defendant does
nothing, then δ15 is made out so that pi12 becomes in, which makes δ4 out, which makes pi1
in. Defendant’s strategy, on the other hand, is to make his other attack on pi1, which is δ3, in,
by providing an evidential argument for (22) that Nieborg obtained the tent on loan which,
if successful, makes δ16 in, which makes pi10 out, which makes δ3 in and so pi1 out.
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Fig. 1 Dialogue after pleadings phase (1): legal issues
5.2 Discussing the evidence in the pleadings phase
After the judge’s intermediate verdict on the burden of proof, the adversaries provided their
evidence by interrogating their witnesses under supervision of the judge. The witness testi-
monies were recorded as if they were monologues of the witnesses. Following the witness
examinations, the adversaries exchanged two more documents, in which they argued that
each had himself fulfilled their proof burden while the other party had not. The case was
then concluded with the court’s final verdict. Dutch Civil procedure leaves the judge free to
assess the evidentiary relevance and force of the witness testimonies (with a few exceptions
that did not arise in this case).
In this concluding phase the nature of the discussion changes. No legal claims are made
any more, and the discussed facts are not ‘legal operative’ facts, i.e., facts such that, if
proven, immediately warrant a legal conclusion (such as ‘van der Velde sold the tent to
Nieborg’ or ‘The work done by Mr. and Mrs. Nieborg for van der Velde was payment for the
tent’). Instead they are ‘evidentiary’ facts, which are meant to prove the legal operative facts
earlier claimed by the parties. The only issue in this phase is whether the evidence supports
the claims of the adversaries for which they have the burden of proof. In consequence, no
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claims, concessions or challenges are made any more and the discussion largely proceeds
by exchanging arguments, counterarguments and priority arguments. Ideally, the premises
of the adversaries’ arguments in this phase should all be evidential. However, we will see
that this was not always the case.
In his decision, the judge is not required to respond to the evidential arguments of the ad-
versaries. In the present case, the judge simply puts his argument in place of that of the win-
ner (defendant), and responds to some of plaintiff’s counterarguments against defendant’s
argument that also attack the judge’s arguments, but he ignores other counterarguments.
An important modelling decision has to be made concerning accrual of arguments. In
all arguments below the various appeals to witness testimonies for the same conclusion ar-
guably are not simply conjoined but are accrued. In other words, each individual testimony
is regarded as a reason for the conclusion drawn from it, so each testimony gives rise to a
separate argument based on the witness testimony scheme. These arguments, which all have
the same conclusion, are then accrued into a new argument for the same conclusion, reflect-
ing that by default it is better to have more arguments for the same conclusion. Accruals
are assumed to be modelled as in Prakken (2005b). In the arguments below I will leave the
accrual step implicit for the sake of brevity.
As for plaintiff’s attempt to fulfill his burden of proof, it was never controversial that
he had violently lost possession of the tent, and he easily proved this with three witness
statements. This is pi24 in Figure 2, which makes δ15 and thus pi12 and pi1 in. Defendant then
concedes plaintiff’s claim with δ25, backtracking to his earlier disputation δ15. This does not
change any dialogical status.
Next we must consider defendant’s argument in fulfillment of his burden to prove that
plaintiff obtained the tent on loan. According to the applicable law the three ‘legal-operative’
facts that must be established to prove this claim are that the tent was (33) given in use
which was (34) free and (35) temporary. In his main argument, defendant’s solicitor does
not clearly distinguish these three grounds, and she neither ties her argument to specific
quotes from the testimony records. Therefore, my formalisation of her argument is to a large
extent a reconstruction of the actual argument. Here is a paraphrase of the argument:
δ26: argue A10: The tent was (33) given in use as proven by van der Velde’s testimony, who
says so (V1,V2), and by Gjaltema (G1) and van der Sluis’s (S1,S3) testimonies, who both
reported that Nieborg had told them so. The use was (34) free as proven by the following
testimonies: van der Velde (V2) says so; furthermore, van der Velde (V3) says that Nieborg
had expressed his gratitude towards him; both Gjaltema (G1) and van der Sluis (S1,S2) de-
clare that Nieborg had expressed to them the same gratitude towards van der Velde; van der
Sluis added to this that Nieborg had said to him that this made it possible for him and his
wife to go on holiday since they had no money to go on holiday. The use was (35) temporary
as proven by the following testimonies: van der Velde (V1,V2) says so; van der Sluis (S3)
states that Nieborg had told him that the reason why van der Velde had given him the tent in
use was that that summer van der Velde did not have time himself to use it. So, (22) Nieborg
obtained the tent on loan from van der Velde. [Target: pi20, which is made out which makes
δ16 in so pi10 out so δ3 in so pi1 out.]
All premises of this argument can be backed by citations from the witness testimony records
(indicated by the Vs,Gs and Ss), so this is a genuine evidentiary argument. Note also that
the argument combines applications of the argument scheme from witness testimony with
applications of implicit legal classification rules and an implicit statutory rule.
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I now turn to plaintiff’s attack on defendant’s proof of the loan. Plaintiff first argues
that the work Mr. and Mrs. Nieborg had done for van der Velde was payment of the sales
price; this attacks the subargument of A8 that the tent was given in use for free. Plaintiff’s
second line of attack is to cast doubt on the sincerity of the three defence witnesses. I have
reconstructed this as an undercutter of all arguments that make use of their statements.
pi27: argue A11: (36) as an expression of gratitude the work of Mr. and Mrs. Nieborg is
excessive, (37) van der Velde accepted the same kind of work as payment by van der Weg
just a few months later, (38) even van der Velde in his testimony (V4) admits that the work
is related to the giving of the tent, so, (39) the work of Mr. and Mrs. Nieborg was payment
for the tent, so, (40) the tent was not given in use for free. [Target: δ26), which is made out
so (recursively) pi1 is in again.]
pi28: argue A12: (41) this is a ticket for a Rheinfahrt of Mr. and Mrs. Nieborg in 1974, so,
(42) Mr. and Mrs. Nieborg have been on holiday in 1974; (43) Mr. and Mrs. Nieborg have
been on holiday on several other occasions, so, (44) Mr. and Mrs. Nieborg have been on
holiday on several occasions; (V3) van der Velde testified that Nieborg had told him he and
his wife could not go on holidays, so, (45) van der Velde has testified something that was
not true; furthermore, (46) van der Velde has an interest in a win of van der Weg in this case,
(47) the law declares witnesses with lesser interests than van der Velde as unfit for being a
witness, so (by 45,46,47), (48) van der Velde is not sincere. [Target: δ26, which stays out so
pi1 stays in.]
pi29: argue A13: (essentially repeating A12 for witnesses Gjaltema and van der Sluis). [Target:
δ26, which stays out so pi1 stays in.]
To comment on plaintiff’s attacks on the witnesses’ sincerity, his attempt to show that the
witnesses lied in their testimonies seems clearly inconclusive, since the witnesses did not
testify that Nieborg had never been on holiday, but only that Nieborg had told them so; this
leaves open the possibility that Nieborg had not told them the truth. However, the judge
made no use of this argument. Note also that, while premise (42) is backed by a copy of the
ticket, premise (43) is not backed by any evidence.
Besides these two main lines of attack, plaintiff also made two minor comments in reply
to defendant’s main argument. The first is that witness Gjaltema explicitly testified that he
did not know (when helping Nieborg to build the tent) whether Nieborg had obtained it on
loan. I have reconstructed this as a separate undercutter of any use of Gjaltema’s testimony,
arguing that this witness was not in the position to know about what he testified. This may
seem too strong, but in the present, logical setting this seems the only way not to ignore
this attack. Note that Gjaltema’s comment cannot be regarded as evidence against his sin-
cerity. The second comment is that the true reason for van der Velde’s anger when Nieborg
told him he had paid enough for the tent was that van der Velde was dissatisfied with the
quality of Nieborg’s painting work. Note that this claim is not backed by evidence. I have
reconstructed these attacks as an undercutter of defendant’s use of premise V7 in A10 on the
grounds that the witness used in this argument is not sincere (strictly speaking this accrues
with the other arguments against van der Velde’s sincerity but in the case documents these
arguments are made in quite different places).
pi30: argue A14: (54) Gjaltema testifies that that he did not know (when helping Nieborg
to build the tent) whether Nieborg had obtained it on loan, so, (55) Gjaltema was not in the
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position to know about (33). [Target: δ26, which stays out so pi1 stays in]
In fact, the conclusion was not explicitly stated as such but in combination with A13 as
“the reliability of the statements of Gjaltema and van der Sluis is therefore doubtful” I have
chosen to separate the two arguments since (49-51) and (54) pertain to different critical
questions of the witness testimony scheme.
pi31: argue A15: (V7) Van der Velde says that he had become very angry when Nieborg
had told him that he and is wife had now done enough work to pay for the tent, since van
der Velde had never meant to sell the tent; (56) the true reason for van der Velde’s anger was
his dissatisfaction with Nieborg’s work, so, (57) van der Velde is not sincere. [Target: δ26,
which stays out so pi1 stays in.]
The defence anticipated plaintiff’s argument that the work of Mr. and Mrs. Nieborg was
payment, and provided the following counterargument.
δ32: argue A16: the work of Mr. and Mrs. Nieborg was no payment since it was done out
of gratitude, as proven by the following witness testimonies: van der Velde’s testimony, who
says (V3) that Nieborg expressed his gratitude, and (V4) that he offered to do the work af-
ter accepting the tent, and (V5) that he would also have offered the tent without Nieborg’s
counterservice, and (V7) by his anger after Nieborg had told him they had done enough to
pay the tent; by Gjaltema (G1) and van der Sluis (S1,S2), who both declare that Nieborg
had expressed to them his gratitude towards van der Velde. [Target: pi27, which is made out.
However, since δ26 has four other attackers that are in, it stays out so pi1 stays in.]
This completes the reconstruction of the adversaries’ arguments.
5.3 The decision phase
It is left to reconstruct the judge’s decision. According to Prakken (2008) we now enter
the decision phase, in which only the judge moves and in which he only moves arguments,
replying to any move he wants. The judge starts by repeating plaintiff’s argument A9 in
fulfillment of his burden to prove the violent events (22) and defendant’s concession of this
claim and then concludes from this that Nieborg has fulfilled his burden of proof. This can
be regarded as a metalevel observation on the dialogical status of the relevant moves, so it
will not be formally represented as an argue move. The judge’s decision concerning van
der Weg’s burden is worth being cited in detail. After paraphrasing some of the witness
testimonies, the decision continues as follows (translated by me).
On the basis of the three witness testimonies of van der Velde, Gjaltema and van
der Sluis, when considered jointly and in their mutual relations, the court regards
as proven that Nieborg had at 5 July 1974 obtained the tent on loan. Although the
witnesses do not use the term ’bruikleen’ (the technical Dutch term for the loan
of the tent, HP), this was not to be expected from legal laymen like a pub owner
(van der Velde), a cattle trader (Gjaltema) and a plasterer (van der Sluis). The court
regards as decisive that the witnesses speak of “to make use of” (van der Velde),
“use” (Gjaltema) and “to give in use” (van der Sluis).
That the use of the tent was temporary is proven by the testimony of van der Velde,
when related to the use he speaks of “for some time”, and the testimony of van der
Sluis, who mentions the period “the summer of 1974”.
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That the use was free is proven by the testimony of van der Velde, who in this context
explicitly uses the word “free”, combined with the gratitude shown by Nieborg as
mentioned by all three witnesses and his remark to the witnesses Gjaltema and van
der Sluis that receiving the tent made it possible for him and his wife to go on holiday
that year.
This all holds notwithstanding the fact that witness van der Velde has a considerable
interest in the rejection of plaintiff’s claim; witnesses more often have an interest in
the outcome of a case. It should be noted that the law does not declare van der Velde
inadmissible as a witness and in addition that his testimony is supported by those of
witnesses Gjaltema and van der Sluis and, finally, that Nieborg has abstained from
calling counterwitnesses.
In reconstructing this, the first modelling decision is whether the phrase “when considered
jointly and in their mutual relations” means that the judge has conjoined or accrued the
various witness testimonies. I have (implicitly) chosen the accrual interpretation since it
allows for a more natural representation of the judge’s treatment of the arguments against
van der Velde’s sincerity (see Prakken (2005b) for a detailed explanation of this claim).
However, this choice is debatable.
First the judge puts his main argument in place of defendant’s main argument A10.
ι33: argue A17: (essentially repeating A10). [Target: pi20. This move has the same effect as
δ26: it makes pi20 out, which makes δ16 in so pi10 out so δ3 in so pi1 out.]
Note that plaintiff’s argue attacks on defendant’s main argument A10 also attack the judge’s
main argument, so in the reconstruction they must be repeated as such (but now moved by
the judge). These are moves ι34 – ι38 in Figure 2. The first of these attacks makes ι33 out so
makes pi1 in again, and the remaining attacks do not change this.
Finally, we must reconstruct the judge’s rejection of plaintiff’s counterarguments. In
fact, the judge responds to only some of these , viz. the attack on van der Velde’s sincerity
and the attack based on Gjaltema’s ignorance. As for van der Velde, the judge first says that
his interest in a win by defendant is not a reason for his insincerity (thus undercutting part
of plaintiff’s argument A12). Then the judge gives some reasons for van der Velde’s sincerity.
ι39: argue A18: (58) witnesses more often have an interest in the outcome of a case, and
(59) the law does not declare van der Velde inadmissible as a witness so, (60) A12 is incon-
clusive. [Target: ι35, which is made out. But ι33 has four remaining attackers that are in.]
ι40: argue A19: (61) van der Velde’s statements are supported by Gjaltema and van der Sluis,
(62) Nieborg has abstained from calling counterwitnesses, so, (63) van der Velde is sincere.
(And r63  r57) [Target: ι35. It was already out so nothing changes.]
(rn denotes the rule with as consequent the statement numbered n). The priority statement
at the end of this argument says that the judge’s commonsense rule for why van der Velde
is sincere has priority over plaintiff’s conflicting commonsense rule. According to Prakken
and Sartor (1996) this is needed to make A19 strictly defeat A12. It is arguably implicit in the
judge’s decision to use van der Velde’s testimony. Note that here it is defendant’s argument
that must strictly defeat plaintiff’s counterargument: this is because the judge’s burden al-
location in ι23 has switched the dialectical roles of proponent and opponent with respect to
the issue of whether Nieborg obtained the tent on loan.
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In fact, argument A19 must be repeated in attack of A15 as moved in ι38, since that
argument also concludes that van der Velde is not sincere. This is move ι41 in Figure 2,
which makes ι38 out. However, ι33 has three remaining attackers that are in, namely, ι34
(that the use was not free since Nieborg and his wife had paid for it), ι36 (that Gjaltema and
van der Sluis are insincere) and ι37 (that Gjaltema was not in the position to know about
(33)). Note that the judge does not explicitly respond to any of these arguments. From a
legal point of view this is understandable, since Dutch civil procedure does not require the
judge to explicitly respond to the adversaries’ evidential arguments. However, it might be
argued that this omission is a rational flaw in her decision, which raises the issue to which
degree legal procedures should incorporate standards of rationality.
Argument A11 in ι34 rebuts and is rebutted by the subargument for (34) of A17 as moved
in ι33. So according to the underlying logic ι34 can be attacked by a priority argument to the
effect that A11 does not defeat the subargument of A17 for (34). Arguably, such a priority
argument can be regarded as implicit in the judge’s use of A17’s subargument for (34). Ac-
cordingly, it has an uninteresting unconditional rule premise.
ι42: argue A20: ⇒ r34  r40, so r34  r40 [Target: ι34, which is made out. But ι33 has two
remaining attackers that are in.]
The two remaining arguments are not rebuttals but undercutters of A17. Of course, we could
say that the judge’s use of all three witness testimonies contains an implicit rejection of these
undercutters. These rejections would have to be formalised as rebuttals: the rejection of A13
should have a conclusion ‘Gjaltema and van der Sluis are sincere’ and the rejection of A14
should have the conclusion ‘Gjaltema was in the position to know about (33)’. Moreover,
these rebuttals should be combined with priority arguments to the effect that the rejections
strictly defeat their target (as in A20 moved in ι42). However, I have chosen not to interpret
the judge’s decision in this way, since he explicitly addresses the attacks on van der Velde’s
sincerity and, moreover, he argues for van der Velde’s sincerity by saying that his testimony
is supported by those of Gjaltema and van der Sluis. For this reason their suitability as wit-
nesses is an essential ingredient of the cases (the more so since throughout the case dossier
the plaintiff implicitly suggests that the three witnesses had conspired). Here the judge’s
reasoning seems clearly flawed or at least incomplete.
Finally, we must model the judge’s remark concerning the fact that the witnesses do not
use the legal term “bruikleen”. Since defendant never explicitly said this, this is in fact, an
example of ‘internal dialectics’ (the system of Prakken (2008) allows the judge to attack his
own arguments in the decision phase). One way to model this is as follows. First the judge
formulates a rebuttal of his argument A17 in ι33 and then he undercuts it.
ι43: argue A21: (64) witness van der Velde does not speak of “bruikleen”, (65) witness Gjal-
tema does not speak of “bruikleen”, (66) witness van der Sluis does not speak of “bruikleen”;
so, (67) the tent was not given in use. [Target: ι33. It was already out so nothing changes.]
ι44: argue A22: (68) van der Velde is a pub owner, (69) Gjaltema is a cattle trader, (70)
van der Sluis is a plasterer, So (71) the witnesses are legal laymen, so, (72) A18 is inconclu-
sive. [Target: ι42, which is made out. But ι33 still has its two remaining attackers that are in.)
The conclusion of this argument is shorthand for the conclusion that the commonsense rule
used in A18 (which is left implicit in that argument), is not applicable to this case.
ι45: terminate
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Fig. 2 Dialogue after decision phase (evidential issues)
Figure 2 displays the reply structure of the ‘evidential’ part of the dialogue, while Figure 3
shows the resulting changes in dialogical status of the ‘legal’ part of the dialogue. Plaintiff’s
initial claim pi1 is now in while yet in the actual case the judge has found for defendant. The
reason for this discrepancy is, as explained above, that the judge has ignored attacks on two
witness statements that he uses in his main argument.
6 Discussion
The main conclusions to be drawn from our reconstruction are as follows. As for the un-
derlying logic, all types of arguments could be formalised in an arguably natural way. The
logic of Prakken and Sartor (1996) turned out to be suitable for modelling arguments using
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Fig. 3 Dialogue after decision phase (legal issues)
defeasible rules (whether legal or commonsense), and arguments about rule priority and ap-
plicability of rules (e.g. argument A4 in move pi11). The adaptation of this logic in Prakken
(2001) sufficed to model a switch in dialectical roles induced by the judge’s allocation of the
burden of proof (move ι23). The techniques of Prakken (2005b) could be used to model the
accrual of arguments in the evidentiary phase (although, as said above, this requires an adap-
tation of the logic of Prakken and Sartor (1996)). Finally, the use of presumptions could be
naturally modelled as reasoning with conditional defeasible rules in the way advocated by
Prakken and Sartor (2006) (argument A3 in move pi10). On the other hand, the case arguably
contains one type of argument that could not be directly modelled in these logics, namely,
A15, which arguably is an abductive argument offering an alternative explanation for van
der Velde’s anger referred to in A10. However, this issue did not play a role in the judge’s
decision. Finally, as already said in the introduction, the case does not contain sophisticated
case-based reasoning or theory-formation arguments. (By contrast, Sombekke et al. (2007),
who analysed a labour law dispute on compensation for work-related injuries, found many
references to precedents in arguments on the classification of factual patterns of behaviour
under evaluative legal concepts such as ‘recklessness’.)
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As for whether the dialogue system of Prakken (2008) is suitable for modelling the
dispute, a distinction must be made between the protocol and the reply structure of the
communication language. The protocol rules of the formal model turned out not to corre-
spond to what Dutch civil procedure says on the allowed procedural moves. In particular, the
Dutch procedure states only few conditions on the argumentative and dialogical structure of
the documents, and it defines turn taking and termination without looking at the dialogi-
cal status of a dispute. Therefore, the formalism can better be seen as regulating a rational
reconstruction of the case by an outside observer. In fact, such a rational reconstruction
can also be made by a judge who accepts the formal system as a rationality standard for
her decision. She can use it when she must decide the case after pleadings have ended. In
the decision phase the judge ideally reconstructs the dispute of the pleadings phase into a
dialectical structure from which she can determine the decision. She will identify the argu-
mentative speech acts made by the parties in the pleadings phase, determine whether they
were allowed according to Dutch civil procedure, and reconstruct how they logically and
dialogically relate to each other. The judge will ideally also complete the adversaries’ argu-
ments with the applicable law, and then express her decision by adding her own arguments,
counterarguments and priority arguments.
It turned out that for a ‘post-hoc’ application of the formal system, the protocol was less
important than the reply structure on the communication language and the notion of dialog-
ical status, which turned out to be largely adequate. As for the locutions expressed in the
case files, it was by and large possible to model them in terms of the formal communication
language, with the possible exception that in a few cases the adversaries spoke of “denying”
a statement, which arguably is a claim of the negation of the statement. The formal dialogue
system does not allow for such counterclaims if they are not combined with an argument,
and therefore I have in such cases formalised the denials as just a why move (e.g. δ4).
As for the structure of the dialogue, the formal reconstruction has resulted in a dialogue
tree that on the whole adequately reflects the attacking and surrendering relations between
the locutions expressed in the case file. Moreover, the dialogue tree has induced an as-
sociated argument graph which gives a largely adequate representation of the constructed
arguments and their dialectical relations. However, in two respects the dialogue tree does
not fully faithfully model the dialogue.
Firstly, what did not quite fit the formalism was the fact that the judge in his final de-
cision simply replaced defendant’s main argument by his own deciding argument. In fact,
Dutch civil procedure allows the judge to disregard to a large extent the adversaries’ argu-
ments and to concentrate on their legal claims and their evidence provided in support of
their claims: it is the judge’s task to provide the legal and factual arguments leading from
the evidence to the legal claims. In the present case the judge, after finding for defendant,
responded to some but not all of plaintiff’s counterarguments to defendant’s main argument.
Therefore, the dialogical status of the main claim in the end was in, which does not cor-
respond with the fact that defendant won the dispute. This arguably illustrates a benefit of
using a formal model of dialogue for reconstructing a dispute: it can reveal that the judge’s
decision is sometimes rationally incomplete. More generally this raises the issue to which
extent legal procedures should incorporate standards of rationality.
Secondly, the requirement of the formal system that each attacking or surrendering move
replies to a unique earlier move in some cases requires that the formalisation repeats moves
where in the actual dialogue they were stated only once. This holds, for instance, for con-
cessions or disputations of statements that occur in more than one argument (see δ13 and
δ14) and for counterarguments that attack premises or conclusions that occur in more than
one argument (as in ι34− ι38). (Systems like those of Walton and Krabbe (1995) and Gordon
23
(1994), which model most protocol rules in terms of the participants’ commitments, do not
have this problem but at the expense of being unable to model obvious dialogical relations
between moves.)
This leads to what is perhaps the most important general conclusion from the case study,
namely, that dialogue systems like the present one seem better suited as an analysis tool than
as a tool for regulating disputes. In my opinion, this also holds for all other dialogue models
thus far proposed in the AI & Law literature, such as Gordon (1994); Hage et al. (1994);
Lodder (1999); Bench-Capon et al. (2000). As a regulatory model, they seem suited for
direct, face-to-face debates or perhaps for human-computer dialogues (e.g. in intelligent tu-
toring systems). Legal disputes, by contrast, (especially the written ones of civil procedure),
seem closer to scholarly and investigative disputes.
As for the process of formally representing a real legal dispute, the main lesson learned
is that it is not trivial to agree on what is the best formal modelling, since the case contains
many ambiguities and leaves much implicit. Some specific interpretation problems were
already discussed in Section 5 and in (Prakken; 2002) I already reported on the occurrence of
incomplete arguments in the case and on the problem of determining their best completion.
Another interpretation problem was that some arguments of the adversaries were clearly
legally ‘clumsy’ (see in more detail Prakken (2007)). I have chosen to reconstruct them in
their legally correct way; this seems justified by the above-mentioned feature of Dutch civil
procedure that it is the judge’s and not the adversaries’ responsibility to formulate the legal
arguments. A final interpretation problem was that, especially in the dispute about factual
matters, it was unclear whether multiple reasons were advanced as alternative, accruing or
conjunctive grounds for the factual claims (the same was found by Sombekke et al. (2007),
who analysed another Dutch civil dispute on its argumentative structure).
From these experiences some tentative conclusions can be drawn on the design of legal
argumentation management systems. To be useful, such systems should probably not simply
offer tools for structuring the lawyers’ documents as they currently write them; instead they
should probably be designed such that they support lawyers in improving their formulation
of arguments. This, of course, raises the issue of whether lawyers will be willing to adopt
tools that force new ways of writing upon them (cf. Shipman and Marshall (1999)).
The reader may perhaps not agree that my formal reconstruction has largely been a
natural representation of the dispute. Since natural-language use is often ambiguous and
leaves much explicit, every formal reconstruction of a case has a subjective element and
may be influenced by theoretical bias. In a few cases this was even deliberate. For instance,
the arguments A12−A15, which all attack the use of a witness statement, have deliberately
been given a conclusion in terms of the critical questions of the argument scheme listed
in Section 4, while such a conclusion was not explicit in the natural-language versions.
Likewise, certain arguments have been deliberately formalised as inapplicability or priority
arguments to make them fit the logic of Prakken and Sartor (1996). However, given that
the representation was aimed to be a rational reconstruction, such theoretical bias is not a
problem as long as it is made explicit. I hope that this paper will inspire other researchers to
model the case in their own favoured formalisms, so that the results can be compared.
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